‘Good Enough’ – But is it Really?

Governments today face a myriad of challenges when determining the optimum approach for issuing a new identity document. To this end, the incorporation of advanced technologies to address the increasing counterfeit threat is critical. 

Unfortunately, many governments choose to use a low-priced, technically acceptable (LPTA) model for their acquisition process. This may also bias their thought process towards wholly digital solutions so as to ‘dematerialise’ the document with the perception that this reduces cost, if only to them.

LPTA is a good method for acquisition of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items, but it places a significant constraint on the level of security offered in identity documents – which, obviously, are not COTS. Essentially, the LPTA model drives bidders to offer just the baseline requirement to achieve the lowest cost – consequently, removing advanced security features from their proposed solutions. The result is a substandard document that is far easier for counterfeiters to simulate.

With the number of counterfeit documents continuing to rise at an alarming pace, any costs that are ‘saved’ by selecting the least expensive, technically compliant solution will be far exceeded by the costs incurred by governments to address the problems stemming from the use of counterfeit documents.

To address this situation, governments should consider: (1) use of best value evaluation to place greater importance on the technical aspect of the proposed identity document, enabling governments to select the proposed solution that best addresses their specific needs, (2) inclusion of specific security features – that go beyond available baseline requirements – as a part of the statement of work and give a wider cost/benefit consideration to the physical/digital balance in identity documents. This ensures that bidders will increase the sophistication of their proposed solutions and in turn, provide a document that is not only good enough, but also secure enough.